Category: Partnerships & Ecosystems

OEM partnerships — where one company’s product gets embedded into or distributed through another company’s offering — are one of the highest-leverage partnership structures available, and one of the hardest to get right. The companies that build them well create durable revenue streams. The ones that build them poorly burn engineering cycles for negligible return.

The pattern that separates the two is structural.

What an OEM Partnership Actually Is

In an OEM partnership, your product is being sold by or through another company’s commercial motion. This is different from co-selling (where both companies sell to the same customer separately) and different from referrals (where one company hands prospects to another).

OEM means the partner’s customer-facing motion includes your product. Sometimes invisibly (your product is embedded in theirs). Sometimes visibly (your product is sold alongside theirs as a recommended companion). Either way, the partner’s go-to-market is doing work for you.

Why OEM Is Hard

Three structural challenges that kill most OEM partnerships:

1. Misaligned incentives.
The partner’s reps don’t get paid for your product the way they get paid for theirs. So they don’t sell yours unless forced to. The OEM relationship exists in contract but not in motion.

2. Engineering investment without revenue.
OEM partnerships often require integration work — APIs, white-label customizations, joint product development. The engineering investment happens upfront. The revenue happens (maybe) in the future. Companies that do the integration without ensuring the commercial motion is structured to produce revenue end up with technical debt and no return.

3. Customer support ambiguity.
When your product is embedded in the partner’s offering, who supports the customer when something breaks? If the partner’s support team handles it, they need to know your product well — which requires training they may not invest in. If your team handles it, you’re spending support resources on customers you don’t have a direct relationship with.

What Makes OEM Partnerships Work

The OEM partnerships I’ve watched generate real revenue share three structural features:

1. The partner’s reps are comped on your product.
Not just contractually — operationally. Their comp plan includes credit for your product. Their quotas include some assumption of your product’s revenue. Without this, the partnership exists in legal but not in execution.

2. Joint customer success ownership.
A specific person on each side owns the customer experience. When something breaks, the resolution path is clear. When the customer wants to expand, the expansion conversation has owners on both sides. Ambiguity in customer ownership is one of the most reliable killers of OEM partnerships over 18 months.

3. Engineered reciprocity.
The OEM motion isn’t one-directional. Either you’re providing strategic value to the partner that they couldn’t get elsewhere, or there’s a reciprocal flow of value back from your customer base to theirs. Without reciprocity, the partner eventually feels they’re doing more than they’re getting and the motion fades.

When OEM Makes Sense

Three conditions where OEM is worth pursuing:

1. The partner has reach you can’t replicate.
They sell into a market where your direct motion would take years to build. Their reach is the value.

2. Your product makes their offering meaningfully more valuable.
Customers buy your product because it’s part of their bundle, not as a separate decision. The bundling creates value the customer wouldn’t get otherwise.

3. Both sides have aligned strategic priorities.
The OEM motion is core to both companies’ growth, not a side bet. When the priorities align, both sides invest in making it work. When they don’t, the partnership atrophies whenever either side has competing priorities.

When to Walk Away

If the partner won’t commit to comping their reps on your product, the OEM is going to fail. Don’t pursue it.

If customer support ownership can’t be cleanly defined, the OEM is going to produce friction that costs more than the revenue. Don’t pursue it.

If reciprocity isn’t designed in, the partnership has a 12-18 month half-life. Pursue with eyes open and don’t expect it to compound.

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OEM partnerships that compound are rare because the structural requirements are hard. The ones that work are some of the most durable revenue motions available. The ones that don’t are some of the most expensive partnership investments to write off.

Build for the structural conditions, or don’t build at all.

Most referral partnerships fail because they’re built on hope and goodwill rather than structure and incentive. The few that work share specific structural features that distinguish them from the many that don’t.

After watching dozens of referral partnerships across multiple industries, here’s what separates the working ones from the dead ones.

What Makes Most Referral Partnerships Fail

The typical referral partnership starts with an executive handshake. “We refer business to each other when relevant.” Both sides agree, mean it, and — for about three months — actually do it occasionally.

Then it fades. Why?

Nobody owns it operationally. Sales teams have quotas tied to direct revenue. Referring a deal out to a partner is, in most comp plans, neutral to negative for the rep. They don’t get credit for the referral. They might lose attribution they could have claimed by working the deal directly.

No tracking, no accountability. When neither side tracks who referred what, both sides assume the other isn’t holding up their end. Often both sides are right. Without explicit tracking, the perceived imbalance kills the motivation to refer.

Asymmetric value flow. One side benefits more than the other. The one benefiting less stops referring. The one benefiting more notices and stops too, because reciprocity has died.

What Makes Referral Partnerships Work

The functional ones share three structural choices:

1. Compensated reps.
The reps doing the referring get something for it. Spiffs. Quota credit. Recognition. The compensation doesn’t have to be large — it has to be visible. Reps who get $250 for a closed referral refer. Reps who get nothing don’t, regardless of executive enthusiasm.

2. Tracked attribution.
Both sides track referrals in a shared system. Not perfectly — but well enough that imbalances are visible. When one side has referred 30 deals and the other has referred 3, the conversation can happen explicitly rather than the relationship dying silently.

3. Defined trigger conditions.
“Refer when relevant” is too vague. “Refer customers in segment X with need Y to partner Z” is specific. Specific triggers convert into actions. Vague intentions don’t.

The Mechanics of Setting It Up

Three concrete moves to actually build a working referral partnership:

1. Map the trigger conditions explicitly.
Sit down with the partner and define, in writing: when should we refer to you? When should you refer to us? Specific customer profiles, specific situations, specific signals. The conversation forces clarity that ad-hoc referrals never produce.

2. Build the spiff into rep compensation.
Both sides commit to comping their reps for closed referrals from the partner. Even a modest amount. The comp signal changes behavior in ways executive enthusiasm doesn’t.

3. Set a quarterly review with explicit metrics.
Number of referrals each direction. Conversion rate. Revenue attributed. Without the review, the asymmetries that kill partnerships develop invisibly. With the review, they get addressed early.

When to Walk Away

Not every referral partnership is worth setting up. The ones not worth it have two characteristics:
– The customer overlap is theoretically present but operationally weak
– One side has dramatically more deal flow than the other in the relevant segment

In both cases, the partnership tends to be lopsided from the start, and no amount of structure compensates. Better to recognize this early and not invest in a partnership that’s structurally unlikely to balance.

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The referral partnerships that work require operational discipline most companies aren’t willing to invest in. The ones that don’t fail because nobody designed them to succeed beyond the executive handshake.

If you’re going to do referral partnerships, do them with structure. Otherwise, don’t pretend the casual version will produce the value the structured version would have.

Many partnerships are called “partnerships” but are really co-marketing arrangements. Press releases, joint webinars, logo exchange, shared content — these are marketing collaborations that don’t require the operational complexity of true co-selling.

Recognizing this distinction — and being honest about which you’re in — saves both sides from building expectations the relationship can’t support.

What Co-Marketing Actually Is

Co-marketing is two companies using each other’s audiences or credibility to reach customers. It doesn’t require revenue integration, joint selling, or shared pipeline. Both companies benefit from association with the other, each gets some marketing leverage, and the collaboration can be low-friction.

Examples: co-hosted webinar where both companies present, joint blog content, shared customer event sponsorship, case study featuring both products, co-branded research reports.

None of these require operational integration. Both sides can cancel with 30 days’ notice. The risk is low, the upside is modest but real.

What Co-Marketing Is Not

Co-marketing is not a replacement for co-selling. Revenue partnerships — where two companies actually sell together and share deal economics — are operationally intensive and structurally different. They require aligned comp plans, joint pipeline reviews, dedicated operators, and real commercial commitments.

The confusion happens when companies call co-marketing a “strategic partnership” and then get frustrated when revenue doesn’t materialize. The co-marketing was working fine — it was just never going to drive revenue on its own, because that’s not what co-marketing does.

When to Use Each

Use co-marketing when:
– You want market exposure with low operational cost
– The other company has an audience that aligns with yours
– You don’t have the capacity for a real co-sell motion
– You want to test the relationship before committing more
– Revenue isn’t the primary goal (brand, credibility, thought leadership are)

Use co-selling when:
– Both companies have aligned incentives for joint revenue
– There’s a specific joint offering that neither company can deliver alone
– You have dedicated operators on both sides
– You’re prepared for the operational cadence real co-selling requires
– You’re willing to invest in the structural commitments (kill criteria, joint plans, shared comp)

The mistake is using co-marketing as a substitute for co-selling and expecting co-selling results. The co-marketing works; the expectation was miscalibrated.

How to Structure Co-Marketing Well

Even low-friction co-marketing benefits from a few structural commitments:

1. Named goals.
“We’ll run a joint webinar” is activity. “We’ll run a joint webinar aimed at producing 200 registrations from our combined audience, with 20% expected conversion to follow-up” is a goal. Goals make it easy to assess whether the collaboration is working.

2. Equitable contribution.
Co-marketing works when both sides contribute roughly equally — audience, content, promotion. Lopsided arrangements decay because the side contributing more notices the imbalance.

3. Time-bounded scope.
Co-marketing works best in discrete projects — a webinar, a report, an event. Open-ended co-marketing drifts because nobody’s managing the ongoing commitment. Define the specific project, deliver it, assess, then decide whether to do another.

4. Honest naming.
Call it co-marketing. Don’t call it a strategic partnership. The clarity keeps expectations calibrated and lets both sides enjoy the collaboration for what it is.

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Most “partnerships” are actually co-marketing. That’s fine — co-marketing is a legitimate, useful form of collaboration. It’s just not the same as revenue partnership, and treating it as such creates disappointment on both sides.

If you have a co-marketing relationship, name it accurately and structure it well. If you need revenue partnership, invest in the operational complexity that actually requires.

Don’t confuse the two. Both suffer when you do.

Looking back: April 2026

There’s a specific partnership in my past that I think about more than most. It’s the partnership that made me a believer in kill criteria — the written, specific, measurable conditions under which a partnership gets formally reassessed and potentially wound down.

Before this partnership, I would have told you kill criteria were a good idea. After it, I made them a non-negotiable condition of entering any new partnership. The shift in practice was the difference.

The Partnership

The details don’t matter in specifics — the partnership was with a complementary company in an adjacent market, announced with some fanfare, and intended to produce joint revenue through co-selling and integrated offerings.

The opening months were what every partnership launch is. Press release. Joint customer kickoff. Executive enthusiasm on both sides. A shared vision for the quarter that would demonstrate the partnership’s value.

The problems started quietly. Initial joint deals took longer than expected. The integration work between our products required more engineering than either side had scoped. The go-to-market motion required more enablement than the partner’s sales team absorbed. Each individual friction was small. In aggregate, they added up to a partnership that was consuming real resources and producing only modest returns.

The Slow Drift

Over the following 18 months, the partnership went through the classic lifecycle of partnership decay:

• The initial ops cadence was weekly. It dropped to biweekly within four months. Monthly within eight. Quarterly within twelve. By month 15, we hadn’t had a formal review in over two months.

• The executive sponsor on their side rotated into a new role in month six. The replacement didn’t have the same investment. They were polite but clearly had other priorities.

• The dedicated partnership operator on our side moved to a different role in month ten. We didn’t backfill specifically — the responsibility got absorbed by a senior BD person who had four other priorities.

• Joint pipeline stopped growing. Joint revenue flatlined. Neither of us formally raised the concern because neither of us wanted to be the one to call the partnership into question.

By month 18, the partnership existed on paper and in a shared Slack channel that had gone mostly silent. We’d both spent significant resources. The revenue return was negative when we factored in the real costs.

Why It Persisted

Here’s the lesson I took from watching this happen — to myself, to the partner, to multiple partnerships I observed from the outside in subsequent years:

Partnerships persist past their usefulness because nobody has the authority or the political space to end them without specific triggers.

Our executives liked their executives. Nobody wanted to be the one who called the partnership dead. The formal termination would require a conversation that would be awkward, and with nothing forcing it, the path of least resistance was to let the partnership quietly continue doing nothing.

Kill criteria would have forced the conversation. With specific written triggers — “if joint revenue is below $X by month Y, we review” — the partnership would have been formally assessed at the right time. Whatever the outcome of that assessment, it would have been a clearer, faster, less politically loaded process than the slow drift we actually experienced.

What I Wrote Into the Next Partnership

When I set up my next significant partnership — same general category, different partner, different structure — I insisted on explicit kill criteria written into the partnership agreement. Specifically:

• At 90 days: named operators in place, weekly ops cadence running, minimum number of joint prospects in pipeline.
• At 180 days: specific revenue threshold for joint-won deals. If below, formal review by both executive sponsors.
• At 365 days: minimum ROI threshold for continued investment. Below that, formal reassessment — either restructure, scope reduction, or wind-down.

The partner pushed back initially. “It feels like we’re planning for failure.” I explained my reasoning — not planning for failure, planning for clarity. Both sides of a partnership deserve to know what success looks like and when the relationship should be reassessed. Without those markers, partnerships drift past their usefulness.

They agreed. We wrote the criteria into the agreement. And when we hit the 180-day mark, we sat down with the data and had an honest conversation. The partnership was performing — but below target. We adjusted scope, revised the cadence, and committed to a 90-day rework period. At 270 days we reassessed.

We restructured. The second phase of the partnership was meaningfully more productive than the first — not because the underlying potential was different, but because the kill criteria had forced the conversations that made us redesign the motion.

The Principle

Kill criteria are not about ending partnerships. They’re about creating forcing functions that convert partnerships from drift mode to decision mode. Every partnership I’ve seen run well has had them. Every one I’ve seen drift into zombie status has lacked them.

The same principle applies to other domains — strategic initiatives, product investments, hiring experiments, organizational structures. Anything that could drift past its useful life benefits from written decision triggers.

What I Tell Anyone Starting a Partnership Now

Write the kill criteria before the press release. If the other side won’t agree to them, think carefully about whether you actually have a partner or a vanity alliance. Real partners are willing to commit to the conditions under which the partnership gets formally reassessed, because real partners understand that a clear, structured reassessment is in both parties’ interest.

The partnerships that work are the ones that both sides take seriously enough to hold each other accountable. Kill criteria are the mechanism for accountability. Without them, accountability drifts.

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The partnership that taught me this was an expensive education in what drift costs. The restructured version of the next partnership — the one where we’d learned from the prior experience — was a meaningfully better relationship.

I’d rather have had the lesson earlier. Now that I have it, I pass it on every time I’m involved in structuring a partnership.

The cost of writing kill criteria is an awkward conversation at the start. The cost of not writing them is an awkward 18 months later.

Choose the earlier conversation. Every time.

Looking back: April 2026

I’ve been through multiple channel partnerships over the course of my career — both as a vendor managing a channel and as an observer of companies that did. The moment I most clearly remember — the one that rewired how I think about channel health — was a specific Tuesday afternoon, in a specific meeting, when I realized a partnership I’d been running for almost two years had been dead for at least eight months without my noticing.

The Setup

The channel in question was a distribution partnership — our product going to market through a partner’s sales motion, revenue shared according to a written agreement, with joint pipeline reviews scheduled quarterly.

On paper, everything was fine. We had joint customers. We had a contract. We had quarterly reviews. Revenue had plateaued but not dropped, which I’d attributed to natural maturation of the relationship.

What I hadn’t noticed was that every one of those “normal” signals had been deteriorating for months. The joint customer base wasn’t growing. The quarterly reviews had become increasingly perfunctory. The specific contacts I’d been working with at the partner had rotated out, and the new ones didn’t know me or care about the partnership in any meaningful way.

Revenue was flat, which in a growth environment is actually decline. But flat revenue doesn’t trigger alarms in most organizations the way declining revenue does, so I hadn’t been alerted.

The Meeting

The Tuesday that clarified things was a routine quarterly review. I walked in expecting the usual: pipeline update, a review of joint customers, a light discussion of what was coming next.

The partner’s new regional head — who I’d met once, briefly — opened by saying: “I want to be direct with you. This partnership doesn’t have an operator on our side anymore. The person who championed it is gone. I’m inheriting it without context, and frankly, I’m not sure what it’s for. Can you walk me through what success would look like from your perspective?”

I couldn’t.

Not because I didn’t know what success looked like in theory. I knew that. I couldn’t walk him through it because, on reflection, the partnership hadn’t been set up with kill criteria, hadn’t been rebuilt when the original champion left, and hadn’t had a real operating motion for many months. It had been running on momentum from a past era, and I’d been managing the appearance rather than the substance.

The meeting was cordial. We agreed to reassess. Within 90 days, we wound it down formally.

What I Should Have Seen Earlier

Several signals had been present that I’d either missed or rationalized:

The original champion left, and we didn’t replace the relationship.
Six months before the Tuesday meeting, my primary contact at the partner had moved to another role. The handoff had been brief. The new contact didn’t have the same investment. I noticed at the time but assumed the relationship would rebuild naturally. It didn’t.

The meetings got thinner but we kept holding them.
The quarterly reviews had been degrading in substance. Earlier ones had real discussion of pipeline, roadmap, customer issues. Later ones were status reports with no decisions attached. I’d read the drift as normal evolution rather than as a warning sign.

Revenue was flat in a growth market.
In hindsight, this was the clearest signal. Both companies had been growing during the relevant period. The partnership’s contribution had not. That delta — partnership growth vs. organic growth — was negative, even though the absolute number was flat. I hadn’t looked at the comparison that way until much later.

The partner had stopped volunteering opportunities.
Earlier in the partnership, the partner had brought deals to us regularly. By the time of the Tuesday meeting, all the “joint deals” were deals we’d brought to them. The flow had reversed without my noticing.

The Lesson That Generalized

After that experience, I developed a more rigorous framework for evaluating any channel or partnership I was running:

1. Operator continuity on both sides.
If the original operator left and hasn’t been replaced with someone who has real investment, the partnership is at risk. This is the most reliable leading indicator I’ve found.

2. Growth contribution delta.
Not absolute revenue — revenue growth relative to organic growth in the same period. Partnerships that aren’t accelerating above baseline are decelerating, even if the absolute number looks stable.

3. Bilateral deal flow.
Real partnerships have deals flowing in both directions. When one side stops volunteering opportunities, the relationship has shifted from partnership to vendor-provider, even if both sides still call it a partnership.

4. Meeting substance.
If the quarterly review has become a status report instead of a working session, the partnership has declined. Meeting substance is a leading indicator; revenue decline is a lagging one.

What I Do Differently Now

Every channel or partnership I’m involved in now has a quarterly health check that explicitly reviews those four signals. The goal isn’t to prevent partnerships from ever declining — that’s unrealistic. It’s to catch the decline early, while there’s still time to reset or wind down deliberately.

The Tuesday meeting taught me that partnerships can die without dying. They can continue generating just enough activity to mask the underlying deterioration, and the activity itself becomes the problem — because it convinces both sides there’s still something there when there isn’t.

The antidote is specific, structured health checks. Signals that matter. Thresholds that trigger action. Kill criteria written before the relationship needs them.

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If you’re running a channel or partnership that hasn’t had a real health check in a while, schedule one. Ask the four questions honestly. You might find everything is fine. You might find what I found, which is that the relationship has been dead longer than you realized.

Better to know. The Tuesday I realized my channel was broken was one of the more important Tuesdays of my professional life.

Every partnership should have kill criteria. Most don’t. The absence of kill criteria is the reason so many partnerships drift from active to dormant to forgotten without anyone formally ending them — and why companies often run five or six zombie partnerships that consume executive time for no return.

Writing kill criteria before you launch is the discipline that keeps partnerships honest.

What Kill Criteria Actually Are

Kill criteria are specific, measurable conditions that, if not met by a specific date, will trigger a structured conversation about winding down or restructuring the partnership.

They’re not “we’ll see how it’s going.” They’re:

• “If joint pipeline is below $X by month Y, we formally review.”
• “If joint-won revenue is under $Z in the first twelve months, we decide whether to restructure or wind down.”
• “If we haven’t had a weekly ops meeting for four consecutive weeks, we escalate to sponsors.”

The specificity matters because specificity creates forcing functions. “We’ll monitor performance” produces drift. “If X by Y, we review” produces action.

Why Companies Resist Writing Kill Criteria

Three reasons, all of them predictable:

1. Kill criteria feel unfriendly.
Announcing a partnership at the same time as committing to kill criteria seems like hedging the relationship. Partners sometimes read it as bad faith. But the companies that insist on kill criteria are usually the ones who take partnerships most seriously — they’re not leaving the program’s fate to politeness.

2. Kill criteria force commercial clarity.
Defining what success means requires agreeing on what success looks like. Which requires agreeing on who owns what, what counts as joint, and how attribution works. Most partnerships defer this clarity because it’s uncomfortable. Kill criteria force the conversation while both sides still have executive attention.

3. Kill criteria create accountability.
Partnerships without kill criteria can fail indefinitely without anyone being accountable. With kill criteria, someone has to make the call. That accountability is uncomfortable — which is why it’s valuable.

How to Write Kill Criteria

1. Set a 90-day and a 180-day checkpoint.
Not just end-of-year. Early checkpoints catch problems while there’s still time to fix them. At 90 days, you’re assessing whether the partnership is running — named operators, weekly cadence, initial joint deals. At 180 days, you’re assessing whether it’s producing — first joint wins, pipeline, revenue attribution.

2. Tie each checkpoint to three specific tests.
At 90 days: is the operational cadence in place? Are there named joint deals? Is pipeline being shared?
At 180 days: has any joint revenue been generated? Is the pipeline growing? Are kill-criteria-triggering conditions present?

3. Name what happens if the criteria aren’t met.
Not “we’ll talk about it.” Specific: “The executive sponsors will meet within two weeks of the checkpoint. The options on the table are (a) restructure the partnership, (b) extend by 90 days with specific revised commitments, or (c) wind down. No fourth option.”

The Most Common Kill Criteria I’ve Seen Used

Across the partnerships I’ve observed running well:

• Operator engagement: if the weekly ops cadence has been skipped 3+ times in 90 days, escalate
• Joint pipeline: if joint-registered opportunities are below a specific threshold at 90/180 days, review
• Joint revenue: if no joint-won revenue has been recognized by a specific date, review
• Strategic drift: if either company’s priorities have shifted such that the partnership is no longer relevant to core strategy, review

Any of these alone isn’t a kill trigger. Two or more at a checkpoint triggers the structured review.

What the Review Should Do

The review isn’t automatic termination. It’s a structured conversation between the operators and sponsors on both sides:

• What’s the root cause of the gap?
• Is it fixable with structural changes (new operators, revised cadence, different joint offering)?
• Is it not fixable (strategic drift, incompatible incentive structures)?
• Based on the answer, what do we do?

Restructure, extend, or wind down. The review forces the decision instead of letting the partnership drift.

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The partnerships that run well almost always have kill criteria. The partnerships that run badly almost never do.

This isn’t coincidence. Kill criteria are the forcing function that keeps both sides honest, engaged, and accountable. Without them, partnerships default to theater — because there’s no mechanism that turns a failing partnership into a conversation.

Write the criteria before the press release. If the other side won’t agree to them, you don’t have a partner. You have a logo swap.

Most strategic alliances are theater. They produce press releases, executive photos, and quarterly progress slides, and they rarely produce revenue. Learning to tell the theater from the real thing is a skill, and the cost of getting it wrong is expensive — both in direct investment and in opportunity cost.

The Theater Tells

Theater alliances have predictable signatures:

The announcement is the deliverable.
The press release, the joint executive photo, the conference keynote — those are the outputs. After the announcement, the activity decays rapidly. No joint roadmap. No joint customer wins. No named operators.

The metrics are input metrics.
“We have X joint customers in our pipeline.” “We’ve run Y joint events.” “We’ve trained Z of their sales team.” None of these are outcomes. A real alliance produces revenue attribution, joint-won deals with named accounts, and expansion revenue from the installed base.

The sponsors change more than the motion.
The alliance gets a new executive sponsor at one of the companies every 18 months. The motion never matures because every new sponsor re-scopes the partnership. The previous sponsor’s commitments are silently dropped.

The alliance shows up at QBRs and nowhere else.
If the only time the alliance is discussed is quarterly executive reviews, it’s theater. Real alliances show up in weekly sales meetings, joint account plans, and monthly operational reviews.

What Real Alliances Look Like

The strategic alliances I’ve watched actually produce revenue have a different profile:

They have a specific joint offering, not just a joint logo.
Customers can buy something from the alliance that they can’t buy from either company alone. This forces commercial clarity — who prices it, who delivers it, who owns the customer relationship. Alliances without a specific offering tend to drift into theater.

They have named operating leaders on both sides.
A GM or equivalent at each company whose job is making the alliance work. Not a strategic-business-development person with 17 other partnerships. A specific named operator with clear accountability.

They have shared commercial terms that survive turnover.
The alliance is structured so it doesn’t depend on the personal relationship between two executives. When the executives move on, the alliance continues because the commercial structure is independent of the individuals. Theater alliances collapse when their sponsors move.

They have joint-sold revenue as the primary metric.
Not pipeline influenced. Not accounts identified. Revenue that both companies can point to as having been impossible to win without the alliance. This is the hardest metric to produce, which is why most alliances avoid it.

Why Companies Make Theater Alliances

The incentive structure at most companies rewards alliance announcements more than alliance revenue. A CRO who announces a strategic alliance with a major industry player looks progressive. The board is impressed. Analysts write favorable commentary.

Eighteen months later, when the alliance hasn’t produced the promised revenue, nobody re-opens the conversation. The alliance just fades. The executive who launched it has moved on or has other priorities. The alliance becomes a logo slide at the next QBR, then eventually drops off that too.

The cost of theater alliances is rarely counted. Each one consumes executive time, partnership team resources, and marketing budget. In aggregate, a company running three to five theater alliances is investing at roughly the cost of a mid-level GTM team for returns that are often zero.

How to Spot Real Alliances Early

Before committing to a strategic alliance, ask:

• Will there be a specific joint offering? When?
• Who is the named operating leader on each side?
• What are the commercial terms, and do they survive the current executive team?
• What revenue metric will we use, and when will we measure it?
• What are the kill criteria if the partnership isn’t hitting targets?

If any of those questions don’t have clear answers, you’re being asked to sign up for theater. Not necessarily in bad faith — often the executives involved genuinely believe the alliance will work. But without structural commitments, belief rarely translates into revenue.

The Honest Audit

For every strategic alliance your company is currently in, answer those five questions. The ones with clean answers are real. The ones without clean answers are theater.

Theater alliances should be either structured into real ones or wound down. Keeping them alive because nobody wants to formally kill them is a tax on every function involved.

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Alliance theater looks good. It rarely pays. The companies that generate real revenue from partnerships have done the unglamorous work of making them operational — and most of their peers haven’t.

The unglamorous work is the whole game.

“Let’s co-sell” is one of the most common and most meaningless phrases in partnership management. Everyone agrees. Nobody actually does it. The co-sell motion exists in press releases and dies in execution.

The partnerships that actually drive revenue through joint selling treat it like a contact sport — specific, operational, and grounded in weekly activity rather than strategic theory.

What Co-Selling Actually Requires

Real co-selling is not: “send me some leads.” It’s not: “mention us to your customers.” It’s not: “we’ll refer business to each other.”

Real co-selling is:

• Joint call planning. Before a customer meeting, both teams meet to agree on objectives, roles, and follow-up.
• Shared deal reviews. Both teams review joint pipeline weekly or biweekly, with specific ownership on each deal.
• Integrated account plans. For key joint accounts, the two companies have one combined account plan, not two parallel ones.
• Coordinated messaging. Both companies’ reps can speak to the combined value proposition, not just their own product.
• Shared compensation structure. Both sides’ reps are comped on joint deals in a way that incentivizes the motion.

When all five are in place, co-selling can drive meaningful revenue. When any are missing, co-selling exists in intent but not in practice.

What I’ve Seen Go Wrong

The failure mode I’ve watched most often: Company A’s rep brings Company B’s rep into a deal, expects Company B’s rep to show up prepared, and discovers mid-meeting that Company B’s rep doesn’t know the account, hasn’t reviewed the context, and is winging it. The customer notices. The joint motion loses credibility in that account forever.

Or the reverse: Company B’s rep has been working an account for months. Company A’s rep gets invited in for a specific expertise conversation. Company A’s rep pitches their full product line, stepping on Company B’s positioning. The customer is confused. The partnership gets quietly deprioritized.

Or the most common: both reps agree to “stay in touch” on a joint opportunity. Neither has a specific next step. Neither has accountability. The opportunity stalls. Neither rep surfaces it in their own pipeline review because the attribution isn’t clear. The deal dies from neglect.

The pattern across all three: no operational discipline. Good intent, no execution structure.

The Three Operational Commitments

Co-sell motions that actually work have three non-negotiables:

1. Joint call prep.
Fifteen minutes before any joint customer meeting, both reps are on a call to confirm objectives, roles, who leads what section, and specific handoff language. Not optional. If either rep shows up to the customer meeting without the prep call, the joint motion is not real.

2. Weekly joint pipeline.
A recurring, short meeting between the partnership operators at both companies where joint deals are walked account by account. Status, blockers, next actions, owner. If the meeting gets skipped for three weeks in a row, the partnership is dying — regardless of what the executive sponsor says.

3. Attribution that both sides trust.
Both companies’ compensation systems track joint deals accurately. If one side is consistently getting credit and the other isn’t, or if the attribution gets argued deal by deal, the reps on the under-credited side stop working the motion. Trust in the attribution math is foundational.

Where to Start

If you have a partnership that isn’t driving revenue but should be, start here:

• Pick three target accounts you’d both want to win jointly.
• For each, build one joint account plan that both sides commit to.
• Run weekly 30-minute joint reviews on just those three accounts for one quarter.
• At quarter end, honestly assess: did the joint motion produce results the individual motions couldn’t have?

If yes, expand. If no, you have data about whether the partnership is real.

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The co-sell partnerships I’ve watched deliver revenue have always had a specific name on both sides whose job — whose compensated day job — was making it work. Every one that didn’t deliver had “partnership” on a lot of titles and in nobody’s actual job description.

Name the operator. Run the cadence. Track the attribution. That’s the motion.

Everything else is theater.

Every company that sells through channel partners eventually runs into the same structural problem: direct sales and channel sales compete for the same deals. Managing that conflict poorly kills the channel motion. Managing it well turns channel into a real revenue contributor.

Most companies manage it poorly.

The Conflict, Named

Channel partners exist because they have reach, relationships, or scale that the direct sales team doesn’t. Direct sales exists because margin is higher and control over the customer relationship is tighter.

Both motions have legitimate claims on certain deals. A mid-market opportunity that walked in through a partner’s existing relationship — whose deal is it? Does the partner get full margin? Does direct take over? Does the partner get a finder’s fee while direct runs the cycle?

Without clear rules, both motions assume the deal is theirs. The partner assumes they own the relationship. Direct sales sees the account and assumes they’ll run it. The customer gets caught in the middle, with two people at your company competing for their attention and providing subtly different answers.

How the Pattern Shows Up

I’ve watched this pattern in telecom most vividly. A telecom vendor sells through systems integrators. An SI brings a deal to the direct team for joint pursuit. The direct team takes the meeting, closes the deal, and the SI gets a referral fee instead of the margin they expected. The SI learns not to bring deals to that vendor. The channel motion dies.

In medtech, the conflict shows up between direct reps and distributors. The distributor brings the relationship. The direct rep shows up for the clinical conversation. The account compensation splits get negotiated deal by deal, which means every deal has internal friction. The friction compounds. The top distributors eventually move their business to competitors with clearer rules.

In consulting, channel conflict shows up between owned delivery and partner-delivered engagements. A customer wants to use a partner’s team for an engagement the firm would have delivered directly. The economics of partner-delivery are different — lower margin, less control. The firm discourages it without saying so. The partner figures it out and stops bringing deals.

The specifics differ. The failure mode is identical: ambiguous rules, inconsistent enforcement, channel partners learning through experience that the relationship is one-sided.

The Three Structural Choices

Companies that run channel well make one of three structural choices:

1. Segmentation by account.
Certain accounts are channel-only, certain are direct-only. No overlap. The rules are written down, shared with both motions, and enforced. This is the cleanest structure and the least flexible.

2. Segmentation by deal size.
Below X revenue, channel gets full ownership. Above X, direct takes the lead with channel in a supporting role at defined comp. This works when the threshold is well-chosen and respected.

3. Deal registration.
Whoever brings the deal first owns it, with defined rules for overlap and handoff. Requires a functioning deal registration system and discipline from both motions to respect it.

Whichever you choose, the rule has to be written down, widely communicated, and enforced. The worst structure is “we’ll decide deal by deal” — that structure is how channel partners learn your company isn’t serious about channel.

Compensation Is the Real Rule

The written policy is only as strong as the compensation model behind it.

If direct reps are comped on full deal value regardless of whether a partner sourced it, direct reps will try to take the deal. If channel account managers are comped only on channel-sourced deals, they’ll fight direct for attribution. If nobody is comped on joint-sourced deals, nobody works them.

The compensation structure has to reward the desired behavior at both motions. Channel partners watch compensation design closely — they can tell whether your company is serious about channel by how your reps are paid, not by what your press releases say.

The Diagnostic

For your top three channel partners, ask: in the last four quarters, how many deals did they bring to you, how many did they refer elsewhere, and how did each of their sourced deals get compensated?

If any of those numbers look worse than they did two years ago, the conflict has already been resolved — against the channel. You just haven’t told yourself yet.

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Channel motions die from compensation misalignment, not from strategic intent. Every executive I’ve watched try to fix a failing channel program by launching a new partner tier, a new marketing push, or a new certification program missed the actual problem.

The fix is almost always in comp plan design. It’s the least glamorous fix and the one that actually works.

The honeymoon ends at month three. Month four is when the work actually starts. Most partnerships never make it past that transition.

I’ve seen this across every industry I’ve worked in — consulting, medtech, telecom, construction — and the pattern is so reliable I can almost predict which partnerships will fail just from the structure of the launch.

The Lifecycle

Here’s the pattern I’ve watched play out dozens of times:

Months 1-3: Announcement and enthusiasm.
Press release goes out. Executives take photos. Co-marketing assets get produced. Early joint calls have both teams engaged. Pipeline gets shared in a spreadsheet that looks impressive. Everyone is excited.

Months 4-6: Reality sets in.
The initial deals don’t close as fast as expected. Joint sales calls are harder to coordinate than internal ones. Each team’s reps revert to their owned-pipeline because that’s what their quota is tied to. Ownership gets fuzzy.

Months 6-12: Drift.
Nobody owns the joint motion. Quota conflicts emerge — whose number does this deal count toward? Strategic alignment at the executive level starts drifting. Quarterly business reviews get lighter. Joint pipeline reviews get skipped.

Months 12+: The partnership exists on paper.
Revenue never materialized. Nobody formally kills it because both sides still like the other logo on their website. Every 18 months someone from strategy asks “what’s going on with the X partnership?” Nobody has a clean answer.

The Failure Mode

The failure mode is almost always the same: nobody owned the joint motion after the executive honeymoon ended.

I’ve seen this most vividly in consulting, where two firms announce a strategic alliance and spend the first quarter actively sharing pipeline. Then each firm’s partners revert to their owned-revenue priorities — partnership deals are messier, margins are lower, and the spoils have to be split. The incentive structure pulls both sides back to their core business, and the partnership quietly fades.

Telecom channel partnerships have the same dynamic. The first six months have executive attention, co-selling agreements, joint training. Then executive attention moves elsewhere. The channel partners and direct sales teams compete for the same deals. Without active management, the conflict gets resolved by attrition — the partnership motion dies, direct sales wins by default, and the partnership becomes a logo slide at QBRs.

Medtech partnerships often die for a different but related reason: the partnership’s joint solution requires implementation effort that neither company’s services team was resourced for. Everyone agrees the joint offering is compelling. Nobody agrees on whose engineer is on-site when the customer has a problem.

What the Partnerships That Work Have In Common

Every partnership that actually delivers revenue — the ones I’ve watched work — has four things:

1. Named operators on both sides, not just sponsors.
Sponsors show up for the announcement. Operators show up weekly. The operator is the person whose day job is making the partnership work — and it should be a day job, not a 10% allocation to someone whose main role is something else. Partnerships run on 10% allocations don’t run. They drift.

2. A weekly or bi-weekly operating cadence.
Not a quarterly business review. A short, operational check-in where pipeline, blockers, and handoffs get worked through. If the meeting gets skipped, the partnership is dying — the meeting is the canary.

3. Joint pipeline review with explicit joint-accountability metrics.
Who’s responsible for each joint deal. What the next action is. What’s blocking. Which side is behind on their commitment. This is the conversation that’s awkward to have and easy to skip. Skip it, and the partnership dies without anyone noticing.

4. Explicit 90- and 180-day review checkpoints with kill criteria.
At 90 days and 180 days, review whether the partnership is hitting the joint metrics agreed at launch. If not, the kill criteria trigger an honest conversation: change the structure, change the scope, or wind it down.

The Diagnostic

For every active partnership you’re in right now, answer four questions:

• Who’s the named operator on their side and yours?
• When did you last have a formal ops review?
• What’s your joint pipeline, and what’s the win rate on it?
• What are the explicit kill criteria?

If you can’t answer those four questions cleanly, you already know how that partnership ends.

Without those four, what you have isn’t a partnership. It’s a press release with a long tail.